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Roberta Romano· COMMENT:
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF OTHER CONSTITUENCY
STATUTES TO SHAREHOLDERS?
A fixed point of corporate law is that shareholders are, and should be,
the OJles whose interests count in corporate decision-making. This does
not imply that shareholders systematically exploit other participants in
the firm or otherwise defeat established expectations (notwithstanding the
implicit assumption in Joseph Singer and Jacob Ziegel's papers);1 such
strategies are not in the shareholders' interest because the parties are in
a repeated, long-term relationship, in which future cash flows matter.
Rather, differences in claim characteristics provide shareholders with the
best incentives regarding the long-term effects on the firm of a short-
sighted redistribution move: (1) employees and bondholders periodically
renegotiate their contracts with corporations as their relations have finite
terms whereas common stock investments have no such term limit;! and
(2) while workers cannot leave their jobs to their heirs, equity claims are
transferable and expected to last beyond an individual's lifetime.
In the takeover setting, however, incentives change dramatically
because it is an end-game: shareholders are cashing out their investments
in the firm, and hence they will no longer bear any direct cost of dimin-
ished future cash flows from an opportunistic redistribution away from
other firm participants.' This is one reason why the debate over bringing
other constituencies into the boardroom has focused on takeovers (al-
though management's self-interest in preserving its employment is, in
my judgment, a far more potent explanation). But the best available
• Yale Law School
1 Joseph William Singer 'Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate' this
issue; Jacob s. Ziegel 'Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution -
An Anglo-Canadian Perspective' this issue
2 See Oliver Williamson 'Corporate Governance' 93 (1984) Yale LJ 1197.
3 To the extent shareholders hold portfolios of stock, then they will bear a cost, albeit
an indirect cost, because other finns' stakeholders, as their periodic contracts come
up for renegotiation, will demand increased compensation as protection against future
exploitation in a takeover. An excellent example ofthis phenomenon is the accelerating
inclusion of event risk provisions in public bond indentures after the great leveraged
buy-outs in the mid-1980s, which produced huge gains for shareholders and
downgradings in credit-ratings of straight debt. See Kenneth Lehn and Annette
Poulsen 'Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Shareholder Conflicts in Leveraged
Buyouts' (1991) 34]. ofLaw & Eean. 645.
(1993), 43 UNIVERSfIY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 533
HeinOnline -- 43 U. Toronto L.J. 534 1993
534 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
data show, in a compelling fashion, that the sources of shareholder gains
in takeovers are not redistributions from labour or bondholders.· As
evidenced by this conference, these data have not, however, silenced the
stakeholder debate.
Economic analyses of the optimal corporate governance structure
could, and would, certainly abandon the shareholder-eentred premise if
some data were brought to bear that would warrant its adjustment or
abandonment. Such data are lacking. Of course, we all have priors, held
with varying degrees ofconfidence, on what would be good public policy.
Consequently, updating beliefs can be a very slow process, even when the
best available evidence is one-sidedly at odds with our beliefs. This
understandable cognitive phenomenon accounts, in myjudgment, for the
differences between the MacIntosh and the Macey and Miller papers on
one side,S and the Ziegel paper on the other; I do not think that it
explains their differences with the Singer paper.
My view on stakeholder issues is similar to MacIntosh's, my differences
with Macey and Miller are minor, on the level of second- or third-order
quibbling, while my differences with Ziegel are, I think, in the realm of
the stickiness ofcognitive updating.6 My difference with Singer involves,
however, what I think is a disagreement over fundamentals: I place great
value on being a citizen of a liberal democracy (and all the intellectual
baggage associated with that),' and his paper seems to endorse a different
world-view, despite the embrace of 'market' language, although I am not
certain of the paper's aim beyond a call for extensive regulation.
Where does this leave me with respect to my role today as a commen-
tator? As I have no interest in engaging in a silly rhetorical dispute over
Singer's idiosyncratic use of terms such as 'a market system' and my
disagreements with the other papers are insubstantial or turn on em-
pirical assertions, I thought that the most fruitful use of time would be
to introduce some new information on other constituency statutes that
may aid in the updating of priors - the reassessment of positions on the
statutes.
4 For a recent literature review see Roberta Romano 'A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,
Evidence, and Regulation' (1992) 9 Yale J. on Reg. 119, 136-42.
5 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective' this issue; Jeffrey G. MacIntosh 'Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law'
this issue
6 For my view on the stakeholder issue, see Roberta Romano 'Corporate Governance
in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis' (1990) 39 Emory LJ 1155, 1163-5;
Romano, supra note 4, 171-3, 139-42.
7 See Roberta Romano 'Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform' (1984) 36 Stan. LR.
923.
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What is the value of 'other constituency' statutes to sho.reholders 1
There is at least one issue on which participants in the stakeholder debate
agree: the impact of statutes or judicial decisions extending corporate
governance rights to non-shareholder corporate constituents should
adversely affect shareholders. This is the basis for opposition to extending
management's fiduciary duty to non-shareholder groups: if a share-
holder-eentred fiduciary regime maximizes the value of the firm and
hence is socially efficient, then shifting to an alternative regime will
reduce firm value and result in an inefficient allocation of capitaI.8
Similarly, the assumption motivating endorsements ofother constituency
legislation is that board decisions based on shareholder interests are
inimical to the interests of the groups whose interests are to be included
in board deliberations under the statutes; otherwise there would be no
need to alter the current fiduciary regime.
This shared prediction concerning the impact of other constituency
legislation on shareholders can be investigated by an event study, which
involves use of conventional financial economic techniques to assess the
impact of identifiable events, such as stakeholder legislation, on share
prices. If shareholders are adversely affected by other constituency
statutes, we would expect firms incorporated in legislating jurisdictions
to experience statistically significant negative abnormal stock returns
during the legislative process. Event studies of the effects of other
takeover statutes have often found significant negative stock price effects.9
8 In the hypothetical bargain paradigm, legislation changing the fiduciary regime
would be a windfall to stakeholders, who had already received some benefits in
exchange for granting shareholders exclusive fiduciary rights.
9 Studies finding significant negative stoclt price effects are: Adam Broner New Jersey
Sooreholders Protection Act: An Economit; Evalu.oJion A Report to the New Jersey
Legislature (Trenton Nl: Office of Economic Policy, State of New Jersey, 1987);
Jonathan Karpoff and Paul Malatesta 'The Wealth Effects of Second Generation
State Takeover Legislation' (1989) 25]. Fin. Econ. 291; Jonathan Karpoff and Paul
Malatesta 'PA: State Antitakeover Laws and Stock Prices' Guly-August 1990) 46 Fin.
Analysts]. 8' Donald G. Margolta 'Stock Price Effects of Pennsylvania Act 36'
(unpublished manuscript) (1991); Michael Ryngaert and Jeffry Netter 'Shareholder
Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law' (1988) 4]. of Law, Econ. & arg. 373;
Michael Ryngaert and Jeffry Netter 'Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio
Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects' (1990) 6]. of Law, Econ. & arg. 253;
Laurence Schumann 'State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The
Effects of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes' (1989) 19 Rand]. Econ. 557; Gregory
Sidak and Susan Woodward 'Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the
Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders' (1990) 84 Nw. ULR 1092; Samuel H. Szewczyk
and George P. Tsetsekos 'State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control:
The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310' (1992) 31]. Fin. Econ. 3.
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It is possible that an alternative prediction could be derived from the
breach of implicit labour contract story of takeovers. 1o Knowledge that
takeovers will permit shareholders to breach implicit contracts will make
stakeholders reluctant to enter into such contracts. If the contracts are ex
ante efficient, then this is an undesirable state. To induce stakeholders to
enter implicit contracts, shareholders need to be able to commit credibly
that they will not tender their shares to a raider who will breach implicit
contracts. The other constituency statute could be a precommitment
device, guaranteeing that implicit contracts will be upheld in the takeover
context. In this scenario, a statute's enactment should increase firm value
(that is, a positive abnormal return is predicted).
To test whether other constituency statutes are detrimental to
shareholders' interests, I undertook an event study of all other consti-
tuency statutes enacted by 31 December 1990, the last date of available
stock returns on the University of Chicago's Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) computer tapes. Several states refined existing
other constituency statutes during the study period, and in such in-
stances, I selected the earliest statute's adoption as my event, with one
exception, New York, where I used the later 1989 statute because there
was uncertainty over the effect of the earlier 1987 statute!! Twenty-five
states were included in the event study.
Mter identifying the statutes, I constructed a portfolio of New York
Stock Exchange-traded firms incorporated in the legislating states. The
sample consisted of 422 firms for which stock return data were available
over my estimation period (from 250 days prior to the date of the legis-
lation's introduction through the bill's enactment into law).
The change in stock price on the event dates that exceeds the stock's
expected or normal return, termed abnormal returns or average resi-
duals, was computed using conventional finance methodology, a market-
adjusted beta excess returns model with parameters for the expected
10 See Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 'Breach of Trust in Hostile Take-
overs' in Alan J. Auerbach (ed.) COTfJO'raU TaJceovers: Causes and Consequ.emes (1988)
33, which is discussed in MacIntosh, supra note 5, at section v, and Romano, supra
note 4, 137-42.
11 See, e.g., Barbara Franklin 'Legislative Toss-Up' 6 July 1989 NYLJ 5. This appears
to be related to the language of the earlier statute, which differs from other states'
provisions, by only charging boards to consider 'long term and shon term interests'
rather than specific constituencies. For a list of the statutes included in the event
study and their legislative histories see Roberta Romano 'What Is the Value of
Other Constituency Statutes to Shareholders' (Yale Law School Center for Law,
Economics and Public Policy Working Paper no. 155, 1992) appendix 1; for a list
of the firms included see ibid. appendix 2.
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returns estimated from days -250 to _10.12 Residuals are examined on the
following three events, separately as well as cumulatively: the day an
other constituency bill is introduced; the first day a legislative chamber
votes in favour of a bill; and the day the governor signs a bill into law.
The results are collected in table 1. As indicated in section A of table 1,
the signs of the average residuals on each of the three event dates is
positive, but they are statistically insignificant (that is, we cannot conclude
that the abnormal return is different from zero). Because it is possible
that the information concerning legislative activity was not available for
trades until the following day, I also cumulated residuals over event days
oand +1 for each event. As section B of table 1 shows, the results are
unchanged: the average residuals are positive and insignificant.
A possible explanation for the residuals' insignificance is that the event
dates are legislative events, and not dates of press coverage. The event
study methodology critically depends on accurately identifying the first
public announcement of an event in order to distinguish abnormal
returns within the specified statistical confidence range, and it is quite
possible that investors are not aware of unreported legislative activities.
The effect of this statistical problem is evident in the most comprehensive
study of takeover statutes, by Karpoff and Malatesta, of 50 takeover
statutes adopted in 31 states; the authors found a significant negative
stock price reaction upon newspaper report dates but not on legislative
event dates. IS I was able to locate newspaper reports of only seven of the
other constituency statutes. The average residuals for this subset of firms,
using newspaper report dates as the event, are still insignificant.14
The use of legislative event dates rather than press dates is not a
conclusive explanation of this study'S insignificant results, because
numerous studies of individual state takeover statutes have picked up
significant negative returns on legislative event dates.1S I also examined
the returns for separate state portfolios, for twelve states with more than
12 Let Au be the excess return for firm i on day t. Then, Ail = R iI - CJ; - jJ;R..., where
Ril is the return on firm i on day t, R.., is the return on the CRSP equally weighted index
(the stock market proxy) on day t, and CJ; and pj are ordinary least squares regression
values from the estimation period, t = -250 to -10. Note that as the event dates differ
across the states, the aggregate portfolio is constructed in 'event time,' whereby each
firm's 'day 0' is the date of bill introduction in its statutory domicile.
13 Karpoff and Malatesta, supra note 9, 308-9, 316
14 The sample consists of 195 firms in Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, Oregon, and Tennessee; the news reports for Florida, Tennessee, and
New York appeared after the legislation's enactment. The average residuals (t-
statistics in parentheses) are .0010 (.5426) for day 0 and -.001l (-.4231) for the
two-day sum of days 0 and +l.
15 See note 9, supra.
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TABLE 1
Abnormal returns on the enactment of other constituency statutes
Sample Introduction Vote" Enactment" 3-day sumC
A. Event day average residuals
Full sample .0071 .0014 .0047 .0205
(.2115) (.0430) (.1368) (.3012)
n=422 n = 361 n=408 n = 361
Enacted with other .0054 .0090 .0060 .0211
takeover laws (.1874) (.2965) (.1983) (.4009)
n=311 n=297 n = 297 n = 297
Not enacted with .0012 -.0028 .0004 -.0015
other takeover laws (.5798) (-1.039) (.0160) -{.3193)
n = 111 n =64 n=64 n=64
Firms with poison -.0001 -.0007 .0005 .0003
pills (-.0447) (-.3164) (.2481) (.0833)
n = 97 n =91 n = 91 n = 91
Firms without .0110 .0124 .0084 .0358
poison pills (.2098) (.2299) (.1570) (.3160)
n = 271 n = 217 n= 264 n = 217
B. Two-day average residuals
for days 0, +1
Full sample .0160 .0117 .0117
(.3359) (.2106) (.2379)
n =422 n = 361 n =408
Enacted with other .0152 .0144 .0149
takeover laws (.3689) (.3335) (.3464)
n=311 n = 297 n = 297
Not enacted with .0011 -.0007 .0023
other takeover laws (.3928) (-.1794) (.6025)
n = 111 n=64 n=64
Firms with poison .0012 -.0002 .0003
pills (.3746) (-.0669) (.0996)
n =97 n =91 n = 91
Firms without .0241 .0199 .0213
poison pills (.3248) (.2147) (.2307)
n=271 n = 217 n = 217
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; n = sample size
• Average residuals re-estimated to exclude 2 states with duplicate event dates
b Average residuals re-estimated to exclude 1 state with duplicate event dates
C Average residuals re-estimated to exclude 2 states with duplicate event dates
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ten firms (sample size adequate to ensure that the statistics are valid). Of
these, half of the portfolios had negative average residuals on the event
dates, and half positive. But only one state's average residuals were
statistically significant: this was the Indiana portfolio (19 firms), and they
were negative.16 These results are consistent with other event studies of
state takeover statutes, which find either statistically significant negative
abnormal returns or insignificant abnormal returns. 17
Almost all other constituency statutes were enacted in conjunction with
additional anti-takeover provisions, particularly in those states with the
largest number of sample firms. As a consequence, the effect of other
constitutency statutes has not been truly isolated but is confounded with
the impact of the other provisions. To control for this difficulty, the
sample was divided into firms in states where an other co.nstituency
statute was enacted in tandem with other takeover regulation (17 states)
and those in states where it was not. The latter portfolio consists of states
where an other constituency provision was enacted separately or with
non-substantive amendments to existing takeover regulation (3 states), or
in tandem with other provisions concerning directors' duties, such as
limits on liability for negligence or regulation of conflicts of interest (5
16 This replicates the results of Sidak and Woodward's event study of the Indiana
control shares acquisition statute, supra note 9, which was in the same bill as the
other constituency statute.
17 For studies finding significant negative results see note 9, supra. Studies finding no
significant effects are: John S. Jahera and William N. Pugh 'State Takeover
Legislation: The Case of Delaware' (1991) 7 j. of Law, Econ. & Org. 410; Donald G.
Margotta and Swaminathan Badrinath 'Effects of New Jersey Shareholder Protection
Legislation on Stock Prices (unpublished manuscript) (1987); Donald G. Margotta,
Thomas P. McWilliams, and Victoria B. McWilliams 'An Analysis of the Stock Price
Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation' (1990) 6 j. of Law, Econ., & Org. 235;
William N. Pugh and John S. Jahera 'State Antitakeover Legislation and
Shareholder Wealth' (1990) 13 j. Fin. Res. 221; Roberta Romano 'The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes' (1987) 73 Va. LR Ill, 142-5. Some of the studies
in the latter category, such as Margotta and Badrinath, supra, find significant
negative residuals over only certain event time intervals and therefore conclude
that the laws have no detrimental wealth effects. No study focused on the price
effects of other constituency statutes, although there is some overlap of included
statutes, given the mUltiple packaging of anti-takeover legislation; see note 16,
supra, and the discussion at text following this note, infra. The Ohio statute
included in my sample is not the same as the 1986 Ohio other constituency statute
investigated by Ryngaen and Netter. supra note 9, and Margotta, McWilliams, and
McWilliams, supra, because I selected the first stakeholder statute to be enacted in
each state.
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stateS).18 As indicated in table 1, there is no significant difference in the
average residuals across the two samples.19
An alternative explanation of this study's insignificant results involves
confounding effects from sample firm characteristics. Researchers have
found that the stock price effects of takeover statutes vary according to
whether firms had adopted more potent takeover defensive tactics prior
to the statutes' enactment: firms with poison pills do not experience
significant negative returns whereas firms without poison pills do.20 This
pattern is consistent with the view of many practitioners that poison pills,
rather than takeover statutes, are 'show stoppers. '21 This could explain
the insignificant residuals because poison pills came onto the scene in
significant numbers only after 1986, and the event dates for the bulk of
statutes in this study, unlike many of the studies that find significant
negative returns, are well after 1986 when pills became widespread.
18 The states with no other provision or non-substantive amendments are Louisiana,
Ohio, and New Jersey; those with limited liability statutes are Hawaii, New Mexico,
and Wisconsin; and those with conflict of interest statutes are Mississippi and
Wyoming. Event studies of limited liability statutes have not found significant stock·
price effects, except on the effective date, long after a statute's enactment would
have been anticipated by investors. See Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani 'The
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance' (1989) 75 Iowa
LR 1; Vahan Janjigian and Paul J. Bolster 'The Elimination of Director Liability
and Stockholder Returns' (1990) l!J J. Fin. Res. 53; Roberta Romano 'Corporate
Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis' (1990) 39 Emory LJ 1155.
Hence, the impact of an other constituency statute's enactment at the same time as
a limited liability statute is unlikely to be obscured by an offsetting confounding
effect. All of the states in the newspaper sample, see note 14, supra, are states that
enacted an other constituency statute in tandem with other takeover provisions.
19 None of the average residuals are significant for portfolios further subdividing the
grouping of states that did not enact other constituency statutes in tandem with
other takeover legislation. Portfolios for laws enacted with limited liability statutes
(18 firms) and for those enacted with limited liability and conflict of interest statutes
(20 firms) display significant negative returns the day before the vote date,
significant positive returns the day after the introduction date, and negative returns
that are significant at approximately 10 per cent on the introduction date. Portfolios
for laws enacted with only insubstantial amendments (91 firms) experience
significant negative returns on the day before the governor signing date. But in all
of these cases, the average residuals, summed across both two- and three-day
intervals surrounding the event date, are not significant.
20 Karpoff and Malatesta, supra note 9
21 For example, this view was emphatically articulated by Charles Exley, NCR'S
incumbent chief executive officer who failed to fend off American Telephone and
Telegraph's hostile bid, in remarks at the ABA'S National Institute on Dynamics of
Corporate Control, held in New York on 5 December 1991, and by Thomas G.
Cody, senior vice president for law and public affairs of Federated Department
Stores, which eventually capitulated to Campeau Corporation's hostile bid, in
remarks at the University of Cincinnati Law Review and College of Law's Con-
ference on Regulating Corporate Takeovers, held in Cincinnati on 15 April 1988.
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Accordingly, the data may be demonstrating that firms' efforts at self-
help through defensive tactics render other constituency statutes
superfluous.
To investigate this possibility, the sample was divided into firms with
poison pills (97 firms) and firms that did not have pills (271 firms) during
the legislative history events.22 As indicated in table 1, the average
residuals, on all event dates, are insignificant in both subsamples. In
addition, while some of the residuals' signs in the poison pill portfolio are
negative, they are uniformly positive in the no poison pill sample. There
is, then, no evidence that self-help defences are obscuring an otherwise
negative impact of other constituency statutes.
There is one further explanation of the findings of statistical insig-
nificance in this event study that I find the most compelling: other
constituency statutes are not perceived to have a negative wealth effect
because they do not create dramatic changes in the common law of
takeovers or in management's behaviour in responding to hostile bids. In
this view, the statistical insignificance indicates that the market is
predicting that courts will not interpret other constitutency statutes
adversely to shareholders.25 To the extent that boards already are
factoring in stakeholders' interest when engaging in defensive tactics,
with judicial sanction, then enactment ofan other constituency statute has
no marginal effect on managerial decision-making, and hence on investor
wealth. Consequently, investors do not alter projections of firms' future
cash flows upon the statutes' enactment. This explanation seems
particularly compelling because many other constituency statutes are
added to state codes that already have restrictive takeover regulations in
place, and the statutes do not provide stakeholders with enforceable
22 Sample firms with poison pills upon statute enactment were identified from the
following sources: Corporate Ccmtrol Alert (1985-1991 volumes); Investor Responsibility
Research Center Corporate Takeover Defenses (1990); and SEC filings available through
the NEXIS on-line database. For the firms' identification see Romano, supra note 11,
appendix 2. Four firms were Irnown to have poison pills but the year of the pill's
adoption could not be ascertained, and three firms adopted pills during the
legislative event time interval. These seven firms were therefore excluded from both
the pill and no pill samples. In addition, the status of 47 firms not listed in the CCA
as having a pill could not be conclusively identified as such (that is, the absence of
a pill could not be confirmed from either IRRC or SEC data). These 47 firms were
not included in the no-pill regression discussed in the text. However, the no-pill
regression was also estimated including these firms (318 firms, 263 excluding firms
in states with duplicate event dates), and the results are indistinguishable from those
reported in the text.
23 For one commentator's contention to this effect, see Charles Hansen 'Other
Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective' (1991) 46 Bus. LaVlJer 1355.
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rights (that is, stakeholders cannot sue the board for what they deem to
be an inadequate consideration of their interests).24 The statutes, from
this perspective, are merely window dressing. If stakeholder provisions
have a function, it is solely for their symbolic value (legislators engaging
in credit-claiming behaviour towards their non-shareholder local con-
stituents).25
Conclusion
Is value added or subtracted by other constituency statutes? The data
identify no significant effect on investor wealth. One explanation is that
the data - particularly the event's dating - are faulty. Although this
objection cannot be summarily dismissed, when newspaper dates are used
for a subsample of firms there is still the same result of no effect. It is, in
my opinion, more likely that the prediction of a negative stock price
effect is faulty. The story which best accords with the data is that other
constituency statutes are not of much moment to investors because they
have no effect on the law of takeovers. Board and court decisions on
defensive tactics remain unchanged in the presence or absence of an
other constituency statute. Consequently, such statutes are unlikely to
deter hostile takeovers compared with alternative forms of takeover regu-
lation and self-help defensive tactics such as poison pills. If flawed
prediction, rather than flawed data, is the more persuasive explanation
of this study's results, then the undue focus of participants in the stake-
holder debate on other constituency statutes, as well as the belief that
such statutes adversely affect shareholder wealth, needs reassessment.
24 See, e.g., ibid. 1372.
25 Cf. Roberta Romano 'The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public
Opinion' (1988) 57 U. Cin. LR 457, 486 (suggesting congressional activity on
takeovers during the 1980s served self-promotion purposes such as advertising,
credit-claiming and position-taking).
